We propose a simple network-based methodology for ranking systemically important financial institutions. We view the risks of firms -including both the financial sector and the real economy-as a network with nodes representing the volatility shocks. The metric for the connections of the nodes is the correlation between these shocks. Daily dynamic centrality measures allow us to rank firms in terms of risk connectedness and firm characteristics. We present a general systemic risk index for the financial sector.
Introduction
The last crisis has identified systemic risk as the most important regulatory issue facing the international financial system and exposed weaknesses in our understanding of the linkages between the financial sector and other sectors of the economy. This article introduces a simple network-based measure of systemic risk for US financial firms, whilst paying equal attention to the interrelationships between those firms, their characteristics, and their links with the real economy.
There are many definitions of systemic risk in the extant literature. It has been defined as broadly as i) problems which impede the functioning of the financial system, Tarashev et al. (2010) , ii) interconnectedness, generally coupled with a recognition that characteristics such as firm size or leverage are important weighting factors in such interconnections, Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) , Billio et al. (2010) or iii) the failure of financial institutions through exposure to some form of unexpected shock which impacts all institutions simultaneously, Allen et al. (2010) . 1 Alternatively, policy makers often refer to systemic risk as the potential for a shock in one firm or sector to result in disruption or even collapse in other sectors of the economy; this approach is apparent in the Promisel Report from BIS (1992: p61), Jean-Claude Trichet's Cambridge lecture in 2009, and in the academic literature such as Rochet and Tirole (1996) .
The Bank of England Systemic Risk Survey conducted since 2009 (Burls, 2009 ), promotes systemic risk as some combination of these common and propagating shocks by asking respondents to identify what they perceive as the greatest threats to the UK financial system. Meanwhile, empiricists have attempted to get to grips with the matter through such means as modeling simultaneous defaults in large financial institutions, Huang et al. (2011) , volatility spillovers in Diebold and Yilmaz (2011) , expected capital loss or capital shortfall, Moore and Zhou (2012) , Brownlees and Engle (2011) . The latter can be shown to directly relate to the CoVar analysis of Adrian and Brunnemeier (2011) with an additional term relating correlation and volatility; see Archara et al. (2012) . A critical building block is the rapid development of the network finance literature which has shown the importance of the form of the interconnectedness of financial institutions in propagating shocks; see for example Allen and Gale (2000) , Freixas et al. (2000) and Gai and Kapadia (2010) . Bisias et al. (2012) provide a comprehensive overview of the methodologies currently in use to measure systemic risk. This paper draws elements from each of these advances to develop a ranking of the systemic risk of the financial sector, and individual firms within that sector. We examine the network of connections between over 500 US companies drawn from the S&P500 index for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] , weighting the importance of these connections both by their underlying strength 1 In the most recent literature systemic risk has taken on a distinct identity from contagion effects which are now understood to measure the unexpected transmission of what ex-ante appeared to be idiosyncratic shocks. Contagion was sometimes considered as a part of systemic risk, for example Allen and Gale (2000) , but this is now less often the case. and also by firm characteristics. The importance of firm characteristics in understanding and measuring systemic risk has been promoted by the work of Moore and Zhou (2012) , and Brownlees and Engle (2011) .
Along with Schwaab et al. (2011) we emphasize that there are both cross-sectional and time dimensions to systemic risk. On one hand we wish to assess risks that arise from the interconnectedness of firms at particular points in time, the cross-section, whilst at the same time being aware of the dynamics of these relationships over time. In order to assess whether the entire system is becoming riskier, and potentially warrants regulatory or policy intervention, it is necessary to have a solid understanding of the usual behavior of the system under a multitude of different economic conditions. The linkages between the macroeconomy and the financial system have been emphasized by authors such as Kapadia et al. (2012) and Schwaab et al. (2011) ; the latter includes macroeconomic and industry level conditions to do this, but in the process sacrifice the frequency of their final outcomes to a quarterly index. In a fast-moving crisis situation a higher frequency index may be desirable.
The results in this article are twofold: a daily systemic risk index for the financial sector, and a daily ranking of systemically important financial institutions (SIFI) over time.
We show that the overall systemic risk in the US financial sector rose to a peak in September 2008 and was impressively and quickly reduced by the regulatory and policy actions which occurred in late September and early October. We are also able to differentiate the behavior of deposit-taking institutions from that of insurance companies by constructing sub-indices for those groups. The deposit-taking institutions had a peak in systemic risk far earlier in the sample period, apparently closely aligned with the turn in the market for mortgage backed securities following the stall of the housing market in late 2007. Following that episode systemic risk for these institutions broadly declined. Insurance companies, however, experienced increasing systemic risk right up to the eruption of the Lehman Brothers and AIG crisis events.
The systemic risk for these institutions then declined substantially, but has shown signs of increasing again following the escalation of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in April 2010.
To examine individual firms we use the bucketing approach of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011) that assigns the systemic importance into four buckets representing increasing levels of additional loss absorbency requirements. The buckets represent the top 5, next 5, following 10, and finally those firms ranked from 21 to 30. We identify the In line with the many definitions there are also many suggested regulatory responses to systemic risk such as greater transparency in financial data, Landier and Thesmar (2011) , tighter regulatory ratios such as for capital, liquidity or even leverage, and a call for new design based on recognition of the network and systemic properties of the financial system; Haldane and May (2011) . Our results are helpful in detecting and measuring the extent of risk building-up in financial networks, and importantly their interlinkages with the real economy, thus providing tools with which to begin approaching such aim.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a more detailed discussion of the definition of systemic risk adopted in this paper. Section 3 explains our construction of the SIFI ranking and the systemic index of the financial sector as a whole. Section 4 provides details on the new data set constructed for this paper. Results are discussed in Section 5. First we analyze the systemic risk indexes for the financial sector and the sub-sectors, follow by a study of the importance of the macroeconomic linkages. We then move to the ranking, focusing on a selection of firms, some of which played a crucial role in the development of the crisis. We end examining the influence of the firm characteristics in the ranking. Section 6 concludes.
Dissecting the components of risk
Along with a number of other authors (e.g. Schwaab et al. (2011) In what follows we dissect this definition, extracting four points upon which we build the methodology in next section.
A system of risks We understand the morphological meaning of systemic risk as the network of risks, or measuring how risks among firms in the economy are connected via their transmission channels; for example Gai and Kapadia (2010) . Our decision to model the network of risks instead of price or returns is motivated by the origin of the crisis. Prior to the upheaval, it was said that collateralized debt obligations (CDO) and credit default swaps (CDS) were efficient investment vehicles for diversifying risks. However, instead of sharing and spreading a given level of risk, CDOs and CDSs were progressively building-up system-wide risks; as shown in Nijsjens and Wagner (2011) . In other words, the magnitude and density of the network of risks in the financial system increased. We therefore use risks measures within a network context as our data set, along with firm characteristics, as explained below. More precisely, we consider a dynamic undirected and weighted network of N firms, and we denote by x i t the risk for asset i (i = 1, ..., N ) at time t (t = 1, ..., T ).
Risk shocks Trichet's definition starts by acknowledging that a crucial component of systemic risk are the threats in the financial system. A threat is an expression of potential to inflict damage, meaning that it may or may not happen. It has therefore an unexpected -or shock-sense. The object of interest therefore is the network of shocks in risks rather than of risks themselves. The shock for asset i at time t is denoted by v i t and is obtained by means of a dynamic filter, denoted by C i (L). That is today's risk x i t is explained by all past shocks:
Note that, conditional on information up to t − 1, the covariance between risks and between shocks is the same: Cov(x i t , x j t |I t−1 ) = Cov(v i t , v j t |I t−1 ).
The financial sector and the real economy The last part of Trichet's definition acknowledges that the financial and the real sectors are intertwined. Indeed, the core businesses of the financial industry are taking deposits and lending to the real economy, and insuring it.
Since a shock in the financial sector may trigger a crisis in the rest of the economy, the object of interest is the relations between shocks in risks not only within financial firms but also between financials and non-financials. The way these relations are modeled is with a network where the strength of the transmission channels between all firms are given by the conditional correlations ρ i j t = Corr(x i t , x j t |I t−1 ) = Corr(v i t , v j t |I t−1 ).
Common and idiosyncratic shocks In another passage of Trichet's lecture, he alludes to the ways in which financial events are transmitted so widely that the fallout reaches systemic dimensions. Following Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and Bandt et al. (2009) these include:
i) The abrupt unwinding of wide spread financial imbalances; ii) negative aggregate shocks that affect all firms in the economy simultaneously; and iii) contagion effects due to the unexpected transmission of a shock in one firm leading to shocks to others. These three channels of transmission imply that systemic risk has common (the first two), and idiosyncratic (contagion) natures, all contained in v i t . To see this, let u t and ε i t be the common and idiosyncratic shocks respectively. Then x i t admits a factor representation:
And the covariance, conditional on information up to t − 1, is:
The higher the contagion (i.e. the covariance between ε i t and ε j t ) and/or the volatility of financial imbalances and negative aggregate shocks (i.e. the variance of u t ), the higher the interconnection between the risk shocks of firms i and j.
In the next section we introduce a network-based index for monitoring the level of systemic risk of the financial sector (which we denote GS for general systemic or simply systemic risk index), and a ranking for systemically important financial institutions, which we denote SIFIRank.
Systemic risk indexes and SIFIRank
A firm is systemically important if it is connected with strong transmission channels to many other firms, and if its strongest linkages are with other companies that are also systemically important. Let S k t be the systemic importance of the firm that ranks in the k-th position at time t, which depends on the importances of its connected peers:
where R k t denotes the set of companies with a transmission channel to firm k at time t. The scale c k j t is the transmission weight between firms k and j:
It represents the transmission channel (given by the strength) between companies k and j at time t scaled by the sum of the transmission channels between the company j and the rest of the system. Note that since i∈S j t c i j t = 1, c k j t can be seen as the (k j) component of a transition matrix of a Markov chain of order one. Indeed, (1) can be written in matrix form as
where S t is the N × 1 vector of systemic risk importances and C t is the N × N transmission matrix that has zeros in the main diagonal since a firm does not transmit risk to itself.
The solution to (3) is the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of C t , which by construction is one.
This is the standard eigenvector centrality measure often used in network analysis. It does not incorporate firm characteristics -we introduce them below-as it only contains information about the transmission channels. This channel-only vector of importances is useful for the construction of a general index of systemic risk for the financial sector, which serves as a bird'seye tool for monitoring purposes. As mentioned earlier, one of the features of the build-up of the financial crisis was the increase in system-wide risks. Indeed, the general index of systemic risk, denoted by GS t , is based on the fact that as the strength of the transmission channels increases, the network becomes denser. Or, in terms of (3), an increase of the values in S t .
Let S F in t be the subset of S t that contains the N F in financial institutions. Then GS t equals the average of S F in t :
The denominator GS B inside the sum is a normalization which makes GS t relative to a particular benchmark. The rationale behind this benchmark is that it represents the most systemically risky day in the sample when a relative denominator is chosen. We choose :
Note that the normalization is the same as in (4), so the maximum and minimum between the financial sector GS index and their sub-sectorial counterparts are comparable.
Firm characteristics are known to play an important role in ranking systemically important financial institutions: a large, leveraged and illiquid firm should be ranked high. Following Brownlees and Engle (2011) , for firm k, the characteristics we use are i) size, measured as the market value of equity and denoted by size k t , ii) leverage, measured as the debt to 2 Alternatively we can normalize by max t ≤t (GS t ):
The normalization makes GSt relative to the most systemic day in the sample history. If GSt = 1 the general level of systemic importance at day t is the highest in the sample, otherwise 0 < GSt < 1. In our sample, normalizing by GSB or max t ≤t (GS t ) gives the same result as the most systemic day of the sample is September 11, 2008. finance the firm and denoted by lvg k t , and iii) liquidity, measured as the assets that can be quickly transformed in cash and denoted by liq k t . Moore and Zhou (2012) use a similar set of indicators. We gather these firm characteristics in the vector fc k t = (size k t , lvg k t , liq −1 k t ), and each company index gains further weight from these features:
where ω is a the vector of positive weights that regulates the contribution of the firm characteristics, and α < 1 is a scaling that weights the relative contribution of the network. The balance between the contributions of the network and the firm contributions is therefore given by α and ω. In vector form
The solution for the systemic risk importances at time t is:
This is an enhanced and adapted version of Google's PageRank that, in turn, stems from the measure of eigenvector centrality measures used for the construction of GS t . The numerical values of the vector of financial systemic importances do not have an absolute meaning while the ranking has a relative meaning. This leads to our ranking metric:
This is a neat and readily interpretable expression. However, it does not consider the general level of systemic importance: being at the top of the ranking in a period of low general systemic risk is not comparable with being at the top in a period of high general systemic risk.
A dynamic re-scaling that adapts to the circumstances is required, which is done by using
This is our second metric for ranking systemically important financial institutions. While, because of the scaling, (6) takes values other than integers, it has however an unambiguous reading: a firm with rank 1 at time t means that it is the most systemic and the level of systemic risk in the financial sector is the highest in the sample history. The extent by which SIFIRank t and SIFIRank * t differ depends on the evolution of GS t . If it does not vary too much over the sample period, both rankings will provide the same qualitative information, specially for firms that rank at the top.
We now see that, besides a simple interpretation, the methodology we propose has the following advantages (some of them previously highlighted): the ranking metrics are straight-forward and quick to calculate with no need for optimizations, and they take into account linkages between the financial sector and the real economy while incorporating firm characteristics.
Data
In this section we first explain issues related with the handling, treatment and cleaning of the raw data. The second part describes how the shocks in risks are defined and computed. Next we present network-based descriptive statistics for understanding the underpinnings of the strength of the linkages and how they evolve over the sample period. The last two parts of the section are short and deal with the construction of the firm characteristics and practicalities regarding the implementation of the methodology.
Data handling
The raw data consist of 5 minute observations downloaded from the Thomson Reuters Tick History for all tickers included in the S&P500 provided by SIRCA for the period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2011. The initial download contains 935 tickers. 3 The dataset used in this paper does not purport to be a full history of all stocks on the S&P500, but rather takes the S&P500 listed companies for the period 2002-2011. Stocks enter and leave the dataset, and at various times there are observations missing for a myriad of reasons (stock halts for example). Our process, carefully documented in the Appendix, is programmed in C+. Thus it is possible for researchers to both replicate the data and make their own alterations to the selections. After this process the sample contains 557 stocks.
We are now faced with sample continuity problems. The methodology we propose is best applied to a balanced panel of stocks. To this end we first truncate our sample to begin in January 2003, as there are considerable numbers of stocks which did not have full data in the earlier years. We then have data of three types: stocks which are present throughout the entire sample, stocks which leave part way through the sample, and stocks which enter partway through the sample. Additionally, some stocks have days of missing values at various points (usually due to stock splits or similar events) and we drop a small number of stocks with insufficiently complete data. We then choose to force inclusion of three stocks which would not have made it through this data cleaning process: these were Lehman Brothers (who were delisted in 2008 after becoming bankrupt), Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Following their placement into conservatorship on September 6, 2008, the ordinary stock of Fannie Mae and 3 The SIRCA stocklist '#SP.00' contains many more stocks than actually trade including OTC and alternative exchanges -we retained stocks with suffixes N,K and OQ which represent the NYSE, NYSE (Amex) Consolidated and Nasdaq respectively. We remove stocks which altered currency of trade during the period and adjust for changes in ticker -there is no unique ticker which traces a single stock through time unlike the unique company or stock numbers found in COMPUSTAT so we match tickers and companies through merger and acquisitions, stock splits and trading halts. 
Computing the shocks
The intraday data refers to the last trade in each 5 minute period between 9:30am and 04:00pm each trading day. These 5 minute data are used to calculate annualized daily realized volatilities as the sum of squared intradaily returns, with the overnight returns removed between each day. These realized volatilities form the basic dataset for the article. More precisely, let r i t j be the intraday trade return of firm i on day t at 5-minutes time j = 1, . . . , J. The annualized realized volatility is
This is the simplest estimator of the integrated volatility from high frequency data and valid if prices follow a Brownian motion. If prices have a jump component this will be incorporated into x i t . Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) show that in the limit the realized volatility of a Brownian motion process with jumps tends to the sum of the underlying quadratic variation and the squared jumps. While the inclusion of jumps in a measure of integrated volatility is a disadvantage for the analysis that focuses on volatility, in our case is an advantage since x i t is a risk measure that embeds information about both the volatility process and jumps.
Jumps have been shown to occur in response to information, and to be a distinguishing feature of asset pricing under stressful conditions (Dungey et al., 2009; Lahaye et al., 2011; Andersen et al., 2007; Dungey et al., 2011) , and thus their inclusion is practically important in attempting to empirically model systemic risk. While the estimator is in principle contaminated by microstructure noise 5 minute data is the commonly used benchmark trade-off between information and noise for liquid assets; see for example Lahaye et al. (2011) and Andersen et al. (2007) . 4 To obtain the volatility shocks, v i t , we filter the realized volatilities with ARFIMA models.
This choice is motivated by Andersen et al. (2001) , Andersen et al. (2003) and Luciani and Veredas (2011) . They show that the ARFIMA(1, d, 0) is an accurate representation of the longmemory stylized fact of realized volatility. Last, the sample transmission matrix is computed as in (2). To minimize the uncertainty due to the estimation error, sample correlations are tested for the null hypothesis of zero. If this cannot be rejected, they are set to zero.
A description of the network
In this section we analyze the interconnection structure of the network in terms of the number of connections and their strength. Upper plot: 50% (solid line), 25% and 75% quantiles (lower and upper limits of the interval) quantiles of the fractions of connections for all firms at each day. Bottom plot: 50% (solid line), 25% and 75% quantiles (lower and upper limits of the interval) quantiles of the correlations for all firms at each moment of time.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows the fraction of companies to which any firm is connected, and the bottom plot shows the strength of these connections. To draw the lines we first measure the median connection and its strength for each company with all the firms of the network.
Second, we compute the 50% 25% and 75% quantiles of these medians. The 50% quantile is represented by the solid line while the other two quantiles are used for the interquantile Upper plot: the black line is the 50% quantile of the fractions of connections between financial firms at each day. At each point in time and for each financial firm we compute the median connection with the other financials. Then we compute the 50% quantile of these medians. The grey line reads similarly but for each financial firm we compute the median connection with all the firms of the system. Bottom plot: the lines read in the same way as in the upper plot but they represent strenghts.
range ( The node of each sector has two dimensions: its radius is the number of firms and the color scale reflects the median strength between the firms that belong to the sector (the darker the more connected). The width of the edges between sectors denotes the strength (the wider the more connected). A glance to the sequence of plots reveals that the financial sector is the most important of the system: it is among the largest and more intra-and inter-connected.
The number of firms per sector does not vary significantly, and neither does the intra-sector strength. However, and more importantly, the inter-sector connections have varied markedly confirming the results of previous figures: prior to the build-up of risks, connections were relatively weak but as time progressed they were reinforced and gained in importance. Indeed, the plots for May 1, 2006 and December 30, 2011 differ substantially. By the end of the sample all the sectors are more connected than ever before, highlighting both the changes that this crisis has promoted in the economy, and once more that the links between the financial sector and the rest of the economy that cannot be ignored. From top to bottom and from left to right the networks correspond to the dates shown on the top of the each plots. The node of each sector has two dimensions: its radius is the number of firms and the color scale reflects the median strength between the firms that belong to the sector (the darker the more connected). The width of the edges between nodes denotes the strength (the wider the more connected the sectors are).
Firm characteristics
The characteristics of each firm are represented with firm size, leverage, and liquidity. Data are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. Size is measured by market capitalization, and observed daily. Leverage is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. As it uses both market and book-based information, it is available daily. Liquidity is book-based and described by the sum of cash and short term investments divided by the book value of assets, and is available every quarter.
These variables are very different in scale and some standardization is needed. Let Size k t , Leverage k t and Liquidity k t be the firm characteristics as explained above for firm k at time t. Then:
log Leverage j t and liq −1 k t = log Liquidity k t − 1 − max j Liquidity j t log 1 + max j Liquidity j t .
The standardization on size and leverage is via cross-sectional averages, so the cross-sectional means of size k t and lvg k t are one for every t. The transformation for liquidity, liq −1 k t , is more involved since the ratio of cash and short term investments over the book value of assets can be negative. The standardization is therefore with respect to the maximum.
Implementation: practical aspects
In order to compute the time variation in the transmission matrix we consider a rolling window.
We start with the realized volatilities and firms characteristics of the first 400 days (roughly 5 The great financial crisis, and beyond
Systemic risk indexes

An index for the financial sector
The plot of the GS t index (4) is given in Figure 4 . It reaches its peak on the day deemed most risky in the sample -which in this case is September 11, 2008. It follows a week of growing stress in the financial system which included the Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The week following the peak, prior to the filing of Chapter 11 for Lehman, was a period of intense speculation as to whether regulatory intervention would occur. Tensions remained very high in the period until September 23, 2008, following the bailout of AIG (September 16); this period has been pinpointed as the most risky in at least 25 years in Nishiyama and Iiboshi (2011) .
Despite the fact that on September 23, 2008, the S&P500 fell dramatically (by over 400 points), the price of oil rose by a daily record amount and the US dollar fell, our index shows that from September 23, the systemic risk in the financial sector began to decline. This is consistent with the realization of an economic re-adjustment to the ongoing effects of the crisis. The extent of the fall is sufficient to reduce the index below levels present in the previous four years. This evidence is consistent with that of King (2011) who finds that the announcement of TARP, and its final implementation, significantly reduced the perception of market risk, and more specifically in US banks resulted in a positive shareholder response due to the generosity of the TARP program compared with the conditions imposed in other jurisdictions (for example the UK and The Netherlands). Thus, in response to the rescue packages US banks actually outperformed the general market. King (2011) interprets this as evidence for the general acceptance of stability of the system, as both banks which did and did not receive had improved share market outcomes, although those who did not receive assistance were more strongly rewarded.
The increase in the index from April 2010 aligns with increasing concerns over emerging problems in European sovereign debt markets. While the first signs of Greece's problems emerged in late 2009, it was in the first quarter of 2010 that international financial markets were affected. The nadir of the GS index occurs around 15th April, which is after the EU bailout package was announced, but before the call for IMF assistance on April 23. The rise in risk seems likely to be related to realization of the severe contagion risks associated with potential escalation of the crisis and the estimated larger combined exposure of the international banking sector to Greece, Portugal and Spain (see "Still in a Spin", The Economist, April 15, 2010).
Indices for subsectors
A convenient mean of displaying the results is to adopt the approach of Brownlees and Engle (2011) who divide their sample of US financial institutions into deposit-taking institutions, insurance, dealers and other financial institutions. Our analysis focuses on the 18 deposit-taking institutions and 20 insurance companies of the sample -see Table 1 for the classification. We do not include the 6 companies classified as dealer/brokers due to the difficulties in classifying firms into this category (Brownlees and Engle, 2011) and the small number of firms. Other financial firms are excluded due to the high degree of diversity in their interests; including, The black line is the GS index for the financial sector, the dashed line for deposittaking institutions, and the grey line for insurance firms.
The GS index for insurance firms tells a different story. The systemic risk index for these 
The importance of macro-financial linkages
Thus far we have provided evidence of the evolution of systemic risk in the US financial sector.
The modeling framework, which takes into account the interlinkages between the financial firms with the real economy represented by companies from a wide range of sectors, is justified by the conclusions drawn in Figures 1-3 . Now we provide further evidence in terms of the systemic risk indices by studying their behavior if these interlinkages are ignored. We adopt the notation of GS M F for the index that takes into account the macro and financial linkages, previously denoted simply as GS. We also construct a financial (sub-)sector index, denoted GS F , which uses only the set of firms in the financial sector as the base for calculating the measures, i.e. the vector S t in (3) represents that risk in the deposit-taking sector is declining relative to this sector as a whole (recall that these are the comparator companies in the GS F S index, and that risk in the insurance sector is known to be rising). As the index is relative it is also increased riskiness of other firms that will drive a relative improvement in a single sector systemic risk index.
Post the collapse of Lehman Brothers the gap between the GS M F S and GS F S index opens substantially, reflecting a disconnection of the systemic risk driven through these firms with the economy as a whole. This is plausibly linked to the success of the policy interventions around this time, which successfully alleviated the risks associated with financial institutions collapsing through regulatory intervention in an environment where lack of credit was adversely affecting business conditions for the remainder of the economy. 6 Effectively the historical links between the financial sector and the real economy were dramatically reduced for the period post September 2008.
A consistent analysis is evident for the insurance sector. Prior to September 2008, the run-up in systemic risk for the insurance sector measured either relative to the entire sample or to the financial sector alone is equivalent, suggesting that the insurance sector was key in the increasing systemic risk for the financial sector as a whole at that time. Post September 2008, a dramatic gap emerges. The interventions to rescue AIG are particularly evident -the GS M F S index drops dramatically, although the GS F S index does not. This is particularly compelling evidence that the policy action changed the interconnectedness of risks between the insurance companies and the rest of the economy. While, as a result of credit shortages and declining economic conditions, firms in the real economy became considerably more risky, the insurance companies did not experience the same degree of increase in risk post the AIG rescue. Thus, the GS M F S post-AIG for the insurance companies shows them as becoming relatively less risky compared with the rest of the economy, but the GS F S shows a relatively slower decline in their systemic risk profile. Interestingly, with the end of the US recession in mid-2009 and the beginning of the Greek crisis, the whole economy based index of risk for insurance companies moves towards the financial sector index, recognizing that relative to the rest of the economy, the insurance sector is relatively exposed to market risks in this period.
This does not seem to be the case for the deposit-taking firms. 
Insurance
The black line is GSMF while the grey line is GSF , i.e. the systemic risk index without incorporating the linkages of the financial firms with the rest of the economy. Left plot for deposit-taking institutions and right for insurance firms.
The SIFIRanking
Bucketing SIFIRanking
In this section we analyze the firm-specific results. Since showing detailed results for the 78 financial firms is prohibitive, we opt for the bucketing approach of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2011), BCBS in short, that proposes a methodology to classify global systemically important bank (G-SIBs). They consider five firm characteristics and construct a systemic importance score, ranging from 0 to 5 and defined as the equally weighted average of the standardized characteristics divided by the sum of all the bank's scores. BCBS methodology shares certain similarities with ours, such as the standardization of the firm characteristics. But there are also important differences: it does not consider network information but only firm characteristics, it does not consider the linkages with the real economy, and the frequency of the observations is annual.
BCBS assigns the calculated scores into four buckets which represent increasing levels of additional loss absorbency requirements for these institutions. An additional top fifth empty bucket provides incentives for banks to avoid becoming the most systemically important. The additional loss absorbency for the top empty bucket is 3.5% of risk-weighted assets, and it reduces by 0.5% for subsequent buckets. This bucketing approach is a convenient way to summarize results; Table 2 shows SIFIRanking in four buckets. Each year of the sample is divided in two semesters (S 1 and S 2 ), presented in the columns. 
Interconnectedness and capital shortfall for individual firms
The Stern V-Lab project (accessible at http://vlab.stern.nyu.edu) provides individual systemic risk rankings for financial firms on a monthly basis, ranked using the Brownlees and Engle (2011) method of assessing marginal capital shortfall. We extracted these rankings for comparison with those generated in the previous section for individual firms. As the Vlab project concentrates on individual financial sector firms, we have drawn from the two databases the deposit taking and insurance companies which are covered in both studies. The ranking profiles of insurance companies for the V-Lab capital shortfall measure and the DLV SIFI interconnectedness measure are given in Figure 9 . It is apparent the disparity in some of the ranking profiles. In some cases, the V-Lab capital shortfall rank and the DLV interconnectedness rank do not change dramatically over the entire sample, for example Cincinnati, An important facet of the individual comparisons for these risk measures is the at times extreme fluctuations in the V-Lab capital shortfall rankings compared with the relatively smoother path of the DLV interconnectedness SIFIranking. This volatility arises due to abrupt changes in balance sheet measures used in the periodic capital shortfall measures, whereas our more continuous, higher frequency observations of market based assessment provide a clearer direction for the changes in systemic ranking. We argue that the volatility in the capital shortfall measures makes it difficult for policy makers to use these measures due to their concern with false signaling -for example, has Wells Fargo really moved from the status of non-worrying to top 10 and back again twice in the space of less than two years -and how should a policy maker act on such information?
The role of firm characteristics Finally, we examine the impact of including firm characteristics in our assessment of individual firm systemic risk measures. As there are a significant number of firms in our database, we concentrate on those identified in our top 10 percent most frequently identified systemically risky financial companies -Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman
Brothers and Wells Fargo-and the additional examples of AIG and Freddie Mac as firms which were at the centre of important events during the crisis. Figure 11 shows the SIFI rank for these individual firms, with (solid line) and without (grey line) taking into account firm characteristics. It is evident that in each case presented here that the systemic rank for each of these important firms in the sample is increased when their firm characteristics are specifically recognized in the network. Note, however, that this is not always the case, and there are examples where firm characteristics make little difference to the systemic rankings; for example Wells Fargo in the early part of the sample, and AIG around the time of its rescue -this latter particularly makes sense as the rescue process is likely to be dominant at this point. Generally, however, for the financial firms which are of greatest interest in this paper, accounting for their linkages and their firm characteristics leads to an increase in the appropriate measure of systemic risk.
Conclusions
Trichet's Cambridge lecture ended with the observations that macroeconomic policy interventions had had a stabilizing effect. In this paper we have shown the importance of including the interactions between the real economy and the financial sector in assessing the systemic risk of the financial sector in the US. It is clear that widening the scope of our network to include non-financial firms alters our understanding of the importance of the financial firms -in some important periods, such as following the recent crisis, the real economy acts to mitigate risks. However, our analysis is confined to one economy, albeit the largest and most important financial centre. It would not be at all surprising if further insights could be garnered from examining domestic and international networks, particularly given the international nature of many of the most systemic banks identified in our study. Cerutti et al. (2012) promote the importance of international linkages amongst the banking sector -and it seems likely that further linking the financial sector to the real economy would enhance these results. Building such an enhanced network is scope for further work. Sensitivity of SIFIRanking to firm characteristics. The grey line is without them, while the black line includes the firm characteristics in St.
